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Abstract
We give conditions under which an individual’s preferences can be identi-
fied with finite data. First, we derive conditions that guarantee that a finite
number of observations of an individual’s binary choices identify preferences
over an arbitrarily large subset of the choice space and allow one to pre-
dict how the individual shall decide when faced with choices not previously
encountered. Second, we extend the argument to observations of individ-
ual demand. Finally, we show that finitely many observations of Walrasian
equilibrium prices and profiles of individual endowments suffice to identify
individual preferences and, as a consequence, equilibrium comparative stat-
ics.
Key words: identification, finite data, preferences, choices, demand,
Walrasian equilibrium.
JEL classification: D80; G10.
With only a finite number of observations of an individual’s choices, can
we predict how the individual shall decide when faced with choices not pre-
viously encountered?
Variations of this question have been extensively discussed for the case
of Walrasian demand, but most of the existing literature either focuses on
the case of infinitely many observations or asks only whether observations are
consistent with utility maximization. The seemingly very important question
of what one can conclude about an individual’s preferences from finitely many
observations has largely been overlooked. In this paper, we pose exactly this
question: what does one need to know about preferences a priori in order to
be able to make non-trivial inference about the underlying data generating
preference with only finitely many data points?
Revealed preference analysis, the weak axiom, was introduced by Samuel-
son (1938) as a necessary condition for demand data, a collection of pairs of
prices and bundles of commodities, to be generated by the maximization of
a preference relation subject to the budget constraint. Houthakker (1950)
introduced the strong axiom, sufficient for demand data to be generated by
preference optimization. Later, Afriat (1967) established the generalized ax-
iom of revealed preference as necessary and sufficient for a finite set of demand
data to be derived from the maximization of a preference relation or ordinal
utility function.Forges and Minelli (2006), Reny (2015) and Nishimura, Ok,
and Quah (2017) extended the argument to arbitrary data sets and choices.
Varian (1982) used the results in Afriat (1967) to discuss the possibility of
making statements about preferences from a finite number of observations.
Hurwicz and Uzawa (1971) and Mas-Colell (1977) gave necessary and
sufficient conditions for the integrability of a demand function, the derivation
of a generating ordinal utility function, and for a demand function to identify
preferences. This answers our motivating question affirmatively for an infinite
number of observations. However, the results say nothing for the case of
a finite number of observations. It does not even address the question of
asymptotics.
Mas-Colell (1978) gave sufficient conditions to ensure that, for a nested,
increasing sequence of demand data that, at the limit, cover a dense subset
of consumption choices, any associated sequence of preference relations con-
verges to the unique preference relation that generated demand. In a recent
paper, Chambers, Echenique, and Lambert (2019) considered the case of pair-
wise choice and showed that convergence fails when data sets are collections
of choices from pairwise comparisons of alternatives become dense, gener-
ating preferences may not convergence to the unique underlying preference
even if the underlying preference relation is continuous. Convergence obtains
if the data satisfies a condition implied by, but weaker than monotonicity.
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For choices generated by a monotone preference relation, convergence follows
from Forges and Minelli (2006).
In this paper, we focus on a related, yet different question. We char-
acterize frameworks where, after a sufficiently large, but finite number of
observations of an individual’s choices, one can identify the preference re-
lation of the individual over a subset of the choice set, X′ ⊂ X. One can
think of the observations of being drawn randomly from some appropriate
distribution over choice-sets. We require identification to be effective in the
sense that strict preferences can be identified as strictly revealed preferred in
the data. We refer to this as finite identification over the set X′. In particu-
lar, we are interested in finite identification over binary sets. Given any two
elements of the choice set x, y with x  y, when are preferences over {x, y}
finitely identified? That is, when can one infer from finitely many observa-
tions on previous choices that x must be strictly preferred to y? This question
combines revealed preference analysis with identification: an algorithm that
determines from the finitely many choices that it is impossible that y  x.
We show that this finite identification over arbitrary binary sets implies
that for any compact choice set, for a sufficiency large number of observations,
one can identify preferences over an arbitrarily large subset of the choice set.
Finally, we derive additional conditions that ensure that one can predict what
the individual will choose from a choice-set not previously encountered.
We consider the binary choice problem in Chambers, Echenique, and
Lambert (2019) and the Walrasian demand model in Mas-Colell (1978). For
binary choice, we show that continuity and monotonicity of preferences are
sufficient for finite identification. In this setting, finite identification implies
directly that one can forecast choices from most binary choice sets. For
Walrasian demand, we show that the assumptions in Mas-Colell (1977) suffice
for finite identification. We also give an argument to show that, for budget
sets not previously encountered, demand can be predicted with arbitrary
accuracy.
A question that arises directly from our analysis is whether any of these
results extent to an equilibrium setting. The lack of available data and
problems with econometric estimation procedures notwithstanding, it is an
important theoretical question whether the necessary information concerning
the unobservable characteristics of individuals can be identified from their
observable, market behavior. The identification of preferences from observed
behavior has strong positive as well as normative implications. The transfer
paradox, introduced by Leontief (1936), makes it clear that knowledge of the
utility functions is necessary in order to identify welfare effects of transfers.
More generally, explanation and prediction, as well as normative analysis,
require individual or aggregate behavior, that is observable, to identify the
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fundamentals of the economy, that are not.
Brown and Matzkin (1990) showed how to extend Afriat (1967) to a
framework where one has a finite number of observations on profiles of equi-
librium endowments and Walrasian equilibrium prices. That is, observations
on the equilibrium manifold. Chiappori et al. (2004) showed that the equi-
librium manifold locally identifies individual preferences. In this paper we
build on these results and show that individual preferences can be identified
from finitely many observations of prices and distributions of endowments on
the equilibrium manifold.
The rest of this paper we organize as follows. in section 1, we describe
an abstract choice setting and make precise what we mean by finite iden-
tification. In section 2, we consider the case of binary choice. In section
3, we consider the case of Walrasian demand. In section 4 we discuss the
equilibrium correspondence.
1 The setting
We start our analysis in a setting of individual choice. Subsequently, we ex-
tend the analysis to a setting in which only aggregate choices are observable.
Objects of choice are alternatives x ∈ X ⊂ RL. An individual has com-
plete and transitive preferences over X that we describe by ⊂ X×X. We
write x  y whenever (x, y) ∈. Associated with the preference relation, ,
there is the strict preference relation,  and the indifference relation, ∼.
For a collection of choice sets, A, a choice function, f : A → X associates
with every choice set, A ⊂ X, A ∈ A, an element, f(A) ∈ A. Observations
are a collection of choice sets and associated choices (A ∈ A, f(A)) or,
for simplicity, (A, f). For a subset of the set of alternatives, X′ ⊂ X, the
restriction of the choice function to X′ is defined on the restricted collection
of choice sets A′ = {A ∈ A : A ⊂ X′.}. Observations are finite if A has
finitely many elements.
A preference relation,  rationalizes observations (A, f) if, for all A ∈ A,
f(A)  y for all y ∈ A.
Evidently, without any restrictions on preferences, this is not of interest
because indifference between all x ∈ X rationalizes any observations.
Within a restricted class of preference relations, rationalization is not
granted, while multiple preference relation may rationalize the observations.
Within a class, P , preferences over a set X′ ⊂ X are identified by obser-
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vations (A, f) if, for any ,′∈ P that rationalize the observations (A, f),
x  y ⇔ x ′ y for all x, y ∈ X′.1
So far, our treatment of identification is not constructive, and it is not
restricted to finite data. Our definition of finite identification below is re-
stricted to finite data and constructive. That is, we require that, within a
class of preference relations, P ,
1. a finite set of observations (A, f) identify preferences over the set X′,
and,
2. identification is effective in the sense that given any finite set observa-
tions, (A′, f ′) with
A′ ⊂ A ∪ (∪x,y∈X{x, y}) , and f ′(A) = f(A), for A ∈ A,
there exists an algorithm to determine, in finitely many steps, whether
or not there exists any ∈ P such that  rationalizes (A′, f ′).
Importantly, effective identification implies that if a finite set of observa-
tions (A′, f) identify preferences over a set X′ ⊂ X then, for any x, y ∈ X′
with x  y, one can determine this relation in finitely many steps: the ob-
servation y ∈ f({x, y}) cannot be rationalized jointly with (A′, f). We say
that, given the observations (A′, f), x is revealed strictly preferred to y and
write
x R(A′,f) y,
which makes clear the dependence on the observations.
We are now in a position to define our first central concept.
Definition 1. Given a nested sequence of finite collections of choice sets, An,
n = 1, . . ., An ⊂ An+1, preferences over X′ ⊂ X are finitely identified within a
class P by observations ((An)∞n=1, f) if there exists an n such that preferences
over X′ are effectively identified by observations (An, f). Equivalently, for all
x, y ∈ X′,
x  y ⇔ x R(An,f) y.
The definition ensures not only identification, but also that one can learn
the preferences exactly from the observed choices. As mentioned in the in-
troduction it combines identification with revealed preference analysis. We
1We define identification with reference only to strict preference for reasons that shall
be clear.
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require that the observations imply that x must be revealed preferred to y
for all x, y ∈ X′.
As explained above, identification can only be meaningful if one restricts
preferences. The preference relation  is upper semi-continuous if, for every
x ∈ X, the upper contour set, R+(x) = {y : y  x}, is closed. It is
continuous if for every x ∈ X the upper contour set as well as the lower
contour set, R−(x) = {y : x  y}, are closed. It is monotonically increasing
(or simply monotone) if x > y implies x  y. It is convex if x  y implies
that λx+ (1− λ)y  y for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. It is strictly convex if x  y, x 6= y,
implies that λx+(1−λ)y  y for all λ ∈ (0, 1). It is strongly montone-convex
if it is montone and, for any convex A ⊂ X and for x¯ ∈ arg maxx∈A , for
any  > 0, there is a δ > 0, such that
x¯  x′ + δ1 for all x′ ∈ A with ‖x¯− x′‖ ≥ .
Finally, following Mas-Colell (1977), Remark 4, we say that continuous,
monotone and convex preferences  are Lipschitzian, if, for every r > 0,
there are numbers, H > 0 and  > 0, such that, if
x, y, z ∈ Xr = {w ∈ X : 1
1 + r
1 ≤ w ≤ (1 + r)1}
with x ∼ y, and ‖x− z‖ < , then
δ(x,R+(z)) ≤ Hδ(y,R+(z)),
where for a set A ⊂ X, δ(x,A) = infy∈A ‖x− y‖.
Throughout the paper, for a preference relation,  and a set, A ⊂ X,
arg max
x∈A
= {x ∈ A : x  x′ for all x′ ∈ A}.
Evidently, if the preference relation  is strictly convex, for any convex A ⊂
X, arg maxx∈A  is either empty or a singleton.
2 Pairwise choice
We first consider the simple binary choice problem. That is,
Ak = {xk, yk} with xk, yk ∈ X,
and
An = {A1, . . . ,An}.
We assume that, as n→∞, the set ∪ni=1Ai becomes dense in X×X.
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Proposition 1. On any {x, y} ⊂ int(X), preferences are finitely identified
within the class of monotone and continuous preferences.
Proof. Suppose x  y for some  that rationalizes the observations (An, f)
for all n. As ∪ni=1Ai becomes dense, by continuity, there must exist a k with
Ak = {x¯, y¯}, such that x¯ < x and y¯ > y, and
f(Ak) = x¯.
By monotonicity, any ′ that rationalizes (Ak, f) must satisfy x ′ y.
The result can also be inferred from Chambers et al. (2019). The proof
here is obviously much simpler, but it does not show identification over all
of X in the limit. Obviously identification is effective since we can infer
from the observations that there cannot be any monotone and continuous
preference relation that is consistent with the data and that satisfies y  x.
It is clear that without restricting the set of preferences finite identification
is impossible.
To what extend does this result allow us to predict choices? There are
two ways to understand this question. First, what are the chances that we
can predict choices if we randomly (uniformly) pick x, y ∈ X? Theorem 1
below shows that, for sufficiently large n, the probability can be arbitrarily
close to 1. Second, can we predict choices from an arbitrary (convex) set
A ⊂ X? Clearly, if A is infinite, we will generally be unable to predict the
exact choice from finitely many observations. However, Theorem 2 below
shows that, for sufficiently large n, we can predict the choice with arbitrary
finite accuracy.
Theorem 1. For any  > 0, there exists a set X′, such that (X \ X′) has
Lebesgues measure less than  and such that preferences over X′ are finitely
identified within the class of monotone and continuous preferences.
Proof. For x ∈ X let O+(x) = {x′ ∈ X : x′  x} and let O−(x) = {x′ ∈ X :
x′  x} . These are open sets and, by monotonicity, subsets of the strict,
upper and lower contour sets of x, respectively. For a point (x, y) ∈⊂ X×X,
let O(x, y) = O+(x)×O−(y), an open set that is a subset of .
Importantly,
∪(x,y)∈O(x, y) =  .
It is clear to see that the left hand is a subset of  . For equality, note that,
by continuity, if x  y, for  > 0 sufficiently small,
x  x− 1  y + 1  y,
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and, therefore, (x, y) ∈ O(x− 1, y + 1).
Next, let K be an arbitrary compact subset of . It follows that the
family of open sets O(x, y) ∩K, (x, y) ∈, forms an open cover of K and,
since the latter is a compact set, there must a finite sub-cover. By Proposition
1, a finite a finite number of observations suffice to know the corresponding
(x, y) of this sub-cover.
To finish the proof, observe that
{(x, y) ∈ X×X : x  y or y  x}
has full Lebesgue measure in X×X and that, for any  > 0, one can find a
compact subset that has Lebesgue measure (1− ).
Finally, our knowledge of preferences on a large set of possible choices
allows us to forecast choices from arbitrary convex choice sets if preferences
are convex.
Theorem 2. Given any convex and compact B ⊂ int(X), for every  > 0,
there exists an n, such that, for any strongly monotone-convex and con-
tinuous  and ′ that rationalize (f,An), any x ∈ arg maxx∈B  and
x′ ∈ arg maxx∈B ′ satisfy
‖x− x′‖ < .
Proof. Define the upper envelope of B as
B+ = {x ∈ B : there is no x′ ∈ B,with x′ > x}.
For a sufficiently large number of points, n, there must be a x¯ ∈ B+ and ob-
servations {x¯j, xj} ∈ An, j = 1, . . . , k, with x¯j ∈ O−(x¯) and x¯j = f({x¯j, xj})
for all j = 1, . . . k, such that
M = ∪j=1,...,k
(
O−(xj) ∩B+
)
surrounds x¯ : for any x˜ ∈ B+ with ‖x˜− x¯‖ > , there is no path connecting
x¯ and x˜ on B+ that does not intersect M. It follows from the definition of
strong monotone-convexity that if the global maximum of  on B is x¯ that
for any  and any x′ ∈ B with ‖x¯−x′‖ ≥  there exists a point strictly above
B+ which is strictly inferior to x¯ and its distance to B+ can be bounded
below by some δ uniformly. The Lebesgue measure of the set O−(x) ∩ B+
can then be bounded away from zero.
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3 Individual demand
We consider the setting in Mas-Colell (1978) and take X = RL++. Budget sets
are
A = {x ∈ X : p · x ≤ 1}, p 0,
and individual, Walrasian demand choices, f(A) define the demand function,
f : RL++ → RL++ that satisfies Afriat (1967) inequalities. For a given mono-
tone, strictly convex and continuous preference relation  we write f(.)
to denote the Walrasian demand function that is generated by . We take
An = {A1, . . . ,An}, where Ak is the budget set associated with prices pk,
and we we assume that prices (pk : k = 1, . . . , n) become dense in RL++.
The key to finite identification in this setting is to reduce it to the previous
setting. For this, the notion of revealed preference we introduced earlier is
important. Given x, y ∈ int(X) we say that x is strictly revealed preferred
to y if there are some pi ∈ RL++, i = 1, . . . , N so that x = f(p1), xi = f(pi),
i = 2, . . . , N − 1 and pi · xi+1 < pi · xi, with xN = y. Note that revealed
preferences are transitive. The key to finite identification is to show that, if
x  y, then x must be strictly revealed preferred to y. The following lemma
is a slight variation of a result in Mas-Colell (1977), Remark 12. We provide
a proof for completeness that closely follows Mas-Colell’s proof.
Lemma 1. .
If  is continuous, Lipschitzian, monotone and strictly convex, then x  y
is and only if x is revealed preferred to y.
Proof. Given any y ∈ int(X), define
Ty = {z ∈ X : y is not revealed preferred to z},
and define a new preference relation ′ by
u ′ v if
{
u ∈ conv(Ty ∪R+(v)) if v /∈ Ty
u ∈ Ty ∩R+(v) if v ∈ Ty ,
where R+(·) denotes the upper contour set.
It can be verified that ′ is upper-semi continuous, monotone and convex.
We can define a demand correspondence for ′ by
h(p) = arg max
x∈{p·x≤1}
′ .
Crucially, it must be the case that f(·) = h(·). To prove this, note
first that h(·) is non-empty for all p. Suppose that for some p ∈ RL++,
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u 6= v = f(p) but u ∈ h′(p). By the definition of ′ this can only be the
case if u ∈ Ty but v /∈ Ty. By the continuity of f(.) there must be a p′
sufficiently close to p so that f(p) /∈ Ty but p′ · f(p′) > p′ · u. This is a
contradiction to transitivity since we would have that y is revealed preferred
to f(p′) which is revealed preferred to u and u cannot be in Ty.
Therefore,  and ′ generate the same demand functions. By Theorem
2’ in Mas-Colell (1977) this implies that they are the same preferences, but
this is only possible if Ty is equal to the upper contour set of  at y. This
proves the result.
With this the following theorem follows directly.
Theorem 3. Given any x, y ∈ int(X), preferences over {x, y} are finitely
identified within the class of continuous, strictly convex, monotone and Lip-
schitzian preferences.
Proof. Suppose x  y; by Lemma 1 x is revealed preferred to y. By con-
tinuity, of demand and the fact that observations become dense, we must
eventually observe prices for which x is revealed preferred to y and prefer-
ences over {x, y} are finitely identified.
Note that the Theorem also follow from the asymptotic results in Mas-
Colell (1978) (the same way that Proposition 1 follows from Forges and
Minelli (2006) and Chambers et al. (2019)). Although the argument is some-
what lengthy it is useful to make it explicit using the result in Mas-Colell
(1978). Suppose x  y and take any sequence of preferences ′k that ratio-
nalizes (Ai, f(Ai))
k
i=1 and satisfies y ′k x. Since we assume that preferences
are continuous, strictly convex, monotone and Lipschitzian they generate
Lipschitzian demand that satisfies a boundary condition and it follows from
Mas-Colell (1978), Theorem 4 that ′k→ in the topology of closed conver-
gence. As Hildenbrand (1994) points out, when restricted to compact subsets
of RL++ convergence in the topology of closed convergence is equivalent to con-
vergence in the Hausdorff distance. Recall that for two sets A,B ⊂ RL the
Hausdorff distance can be written as
dH(A,B) = inf{ε ≥ 0 ; A ⊆ Bε and B ⊆ Aε},
where, for any set C
Cε :=
⋃
x∈C
{z ∈ RL d(z, (x, y)) ≤ ε}.
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But, since x  y, clearly, (y, x) ∈′k while (y, x) /∈. Furthermore there
must be an open  neighborhood around (x, y) in X × X so that x′  y′
in that neighborhood. Therefore (y, x) /∈, and for all k, and ′k* – a
contradiction to the definition of convergence.
It remains to be shown that identification is effective. For this, consider
the observations (Ak, fk). By the argument in Afriat (1967), there is a solu-
tion to the system of inequalities
φj ≤ φi + λipi(xj − xi), λi > 0. (Ak)
and the utility function
uk(x) = min{. . . φi + λipi(x− xi), . . .}
rationalizes the observations. Augment the system by the inequality
uy ≤ φi + p0(xi − y),
and note that, in the last inequality, prices are a variable, they are not part of
the data as in the inequalities (Ak), while the variable λ0 has been normalized
to 1. By our argument above, for k large, x  y implies that there must be
a x1  x but sufficiently close to x such that there can be no solution to
the inequalities with uy > φ1. Importantly, the fact that there is no solution
does not only imply that there is no piece-wise linear utility function, but
by Afriat’s theorem it implies that there is no continuous and quasi-concave
utility function.
Note that the assumption that preferences are Lipschitzian cannot be dis-
pensed with. This is surprising since with a finite number of observations one
cannot test whether preferences are Lipschitzian. Nor can one test whether
they are strictly convex. However, only the assumption of Lipschtitzian and
strictly convex preferences guarantees that for sufficiently many observations
the Afriat-inequalities no longer have a solution.
Theorems 1 and 2 above now directly apply to the individual demand
setting. Preferences are finitely identified over arbitrarily large (strict) sub-
sets of any compact subset of RL++, and we can forecast demand at any given
price within  as the set of observations becomes sufficiently large. This lat-
ter result is similar to the result Beigman and Vohra (2006) – they consider
a more sophisticated setting of PAC-learning.
4 Equilibrium
So far, our analysis focused on the classical choice setting. More gener-
ally, economic theory derives relationships between the fundamentals of the
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economy, some of which may not be observable, and observed individual or
aggregate behavior and prices. It is then of interest to ask whether what is
observed can be used to deduce individual preferences. We tackle this issue
in the classical setting of Walrasian equilibrium and assume that individual
behavior, individual demand in particular, is not observable. Observations
consist of equilibrium prices and individual endowments.
As Brown and Matzkin (1990) and Chiappori et al. (2004) point out, this
is equivalent to assuming that the aggregate demand function, as a function
of prices and profiles of individual incomes, is observable. However, if only
aggregate demand behavior is observable, the identification of the preference
relations of individuals is more surprising: it might be possible to disag-
gregate the observed behaviors into different families of individual demand
functions generated by different profiles of utilities. Indeed, Chiappori et al.
(2004) give an example with quasi - linear preferences that shows that this
may be the case. But surprisingly, they also derive sufficient condition on
aggregate demand that ensure that identification is possible.
For a finite number of observations the result seems even more surprising.
How can one possibly infer from observations on aggregate demand that indi-
vidual h prefers two apples to one banana? The key lies in the construction in
Brown and Matzkin (1990) of necessary and sufficient conditions for observed
aggregate demand to be rationalized by individual utility maximization. The
requirement is that there exist individual demands that satisfy the strong ax-
iom and add up to aggregate demand. With a large number of observations,
the possible individual demands turn out to be restricted to a “small set ”
of possible demands, and, from this, one can infer individual preferences.
Instead of taking choice sets and resulting choices as fundamentals, we
assume that one observes the aggregate demand of individuals, h ∈ H that
we denote by z(p, wH). The profile of incomes wH = (wh)h∈H varies inde-
pendently of prices, and aggregate demand is the sum of individual demand
functions. A sequence of observations consists of (pi, w
H
i , z(pi, w
H
i ))i=1,...,n.
Brown and Matzkin (1990) show that the model is testable. In order to
define finite identification in this framework, there is one important qualifica-
tion we have to make. Since we want to show that finitely many observations
on aggregate demand locally identify preferences we have to assume that the
wH lie in some a compact subset W ⊂ RH++ with non-empty interior – if one
allows boundary values the argument trivially reduces to the previous case,
since aggregate demand and individual demand are identical if there is only
one individual as Balasko (1999) pointed out.
To modify Definition 1 for this setting, consider a sequence (pi, w
H
i , z(pi,
wHi )), i = 1, . . ., (pi, wi)
H ∈ RL++ ×W for all i, with {(pi, wWi ), i = 1, . . . n}
becoming dense in RL++×W as n→∞. For an individual, h¯ ∈ H preferences
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over Xh¯
′ ⊂ Xh¯ are finitely identified within a class P , if there is an n such
that, for all x, y ∈ Xh¯ x  y implies that, for all xh¯i ∈ X, pi · xh¯i = wh¯i for all
i = 1, . . . , n and all h ∈ H with∑
h∈H
xhi = z(pi, w
H
i ) for all i = 1, . . . n
and with (xhi , pi)i=1...n satisfying SARP for all h ∈ H, the revealed preference
relation
x h¯R((Ai,xh¯i )i=1...n) y with Ai = {x : pi · x ≤ wh¯i }
holds.
In other words, whenever there are individual demands that are consistent
with SARP and add up to aggregate demand, x must be strictly revealed
preferred to y by individual h¯.
Are there conditions under which it is possible that preferences of some in-
dividual are finitely identifiable? Chiappori et al. (2004) consider the asymp-
totic case and derive such conditions. Building on this, and on Mas-Colell
(1978) we can derive such conditions.
In order to proof our main result we need the following assumptions from
Chiappori et al. (2004). These assumptions are directly on demand and not
on preferences.
Assumption 1. 1. For every individual, h ∈ H, the income effect for
every commodity, ∂zl/∂w
h is a twice differentiable function of income
and
∂2zl
∂(wh)2
6= 0.
2. For every individual, h there exist commodities, m 6= 1 and n 6= 1 ,
such that
∂
∂wh
(ln
∂2zm
(∂wh)2
) 6= ∂
∂wh
(ln
∂2zn
(∂wh)2
).
Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2 are from Chiappori et al. (2004) and they ensure
that income effects do not vanish for any commodity, while there are two com-
modities for which the partial elasticities of the income effects with respect to
revenue do not vanish. Assumption 1.2 implies that there are at least three
commodities: L ≥ 3; a different argument is required for economies with two
commodities, L = 2.
Theorem 4. Let z(p, wH) be a continuous aggregate demand function satis-
fying Assumption 1 being generated by preferences (h)h∈H. Preferences of
individual h¯ are finitely identified over {x, y}, x, y ∈ Xh within the class of
continuous, monotone, strictly convex and Lipschitzian preferences.
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To prove the result we need two lemmas that establish that preferences
are uniquely identified in the limit.
Given any n, define (hn)h∈H to be any profile of preferences consistent
with the observations (p1, w
H
1 , z1), . . . , (pn, w
H
n , zn) in the sense that there are
allocations xHi that add up to observed aggregate demand,
∑
h∈H x
h
i = zi for
all i and that each xhi is rationalized by hn.
The following lemma follows directly from Mas-Colell (1978).
Lemma 2. Suppose (hn)h∈H → (h)h∈H in the topology of closed conver-
gence. Then z(p, w1, . . . , wH) is generated by (h)h∈H.
Proof. Suppose  does not generate aggregate demand at a point (p, wH).
Then there must be individual demands x˜h,
∑
h x˜
h 6= z(p, wH) with each
x˜h ∈ arg max
x∈{x:p·x≤wh}
h .
As in Mas-Colell’s proof of Lemma 3, by denseness, there is a sequence of
observations (pn, w
H
n ) → (p, wH). Clearly since aggregate demand is con-
tinuous z(pn, w
H
n ) → z(p, wH) and therefore there must be allocations as-
sociated with a sub-sequence that satisfy xhn → xh for all h, with xhn ∈
arg maxx∈{x:pn·x≤whn} hn and with
∑
h x
h = h(p, wH). It suffices to show that
for at least one h xh  x˜h. Since this now reduces to an individual problem
the result follows from Lemma 3 in Mas-Colell (1978).
The following lemma is the main result in Chiappori et al. (2004).
Lemma 3. Suppose (h)h∈H and (˜h)h∈H rationalize an aggregate demand
function that satisfies Assumption 1.1.-1.4. Then (h)h∈H = (˜h)h∈H.
The proof of Theorem 4 is as follows.
Proof. We first show that preferences are uniquely identified in the limit.
This part of the proof is almost identical to the proof of Theorem 4 in Mas-
Colell (1978) – we repeat the main steps for completeness. Suppose Hn
are as the sequences constructed above. Since the closure of the considered
preferences are closed convergence compact the sequence must have an ac-
cumulation point ∗. By Lemma 2 this generates aggregate demand. By
Lemma 3 it is the unique preference relation that generates aggregate de-
mand. Therefore n cannot have a different accumulation point.
As in the proof of Theorem 3 , convergence in the topology of closed con-
vergence is equivalent to convergence in the Hausdorff metric, and n→∗
implies that at some finite n the true preferences and the constructed pref-
erences must agree on a given strict comparison.
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As in the case of individual demand, Theorems 1 and 2 can be directly
applied to this setting of aggregate demand. A sufficiently large, finite set
of observations allows us to know agents’ preferences over large (infinite)
sets and it allows us to predict their choices (within some ) at prices not
previously encountered.
Famously, for excess demand as a function of the prices of commodities,
Debreu (1974) and Mantel (1974) provided negative results, which confirmed
initial results in Sonnenschein (1973): as long as the number of individuals
aggregated is large relative to the number of commodities, aggregate excess
demand need not satisfy any restrictions beyond homogeneity and Walras’
law as prices vary in a compact set of strictly positive prices; The overall
impression from the work following the conundruM posed by Sonnenschein
(1973) was that individual rationality fails to generate observable implica-
tions for a general specification of endowments and preferences as is standard
in the theory of general competitive equilibrium; which was interpreted to
confirm that the theory does not also explanation and prediction.
Alternatively, in critical and insightful contributions, Brown and Matzkin
(1990) and Brown and Matzkin (1996) pointed out that (1) demand is not
easily — or, for that matter, in principal — observable out of equilibrium; (2)
prices are not the only variables that determine the demand of individuals.
Prices movements reflect fluctuations in the fundamentals of an economy.
The relationship between these fundamentals and the resulting equilibrium
prices is a natural focus for empirical observation. What theory should aim
at are observable relationships between equilibrium prices and fundamentals.
Following a revealed preference approach, Brown and Matzkin (1990) gave a
set of testable restrictions that apply to finite data sets.
Here, following Brown and Matzkin (1990), Brown and Matzkin (1996)
and Chiappori, Ekeland, Kubler, and Polemarchakis (2004), one observes
aggregate demand as, not only the prices of commodities, but, also, the en-
dowments or incomes of individuals vary. Alternatively, one observes the set
of equilibrium prices, locally, as a function of the endowments or incomes of
individuals. We show that general equilibrium theory allows for explanation
and prediction even with a finite set of observations.
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